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We propose an evolutionary model in which boundedly rational firms compete and learn in a dynamic oligopoly 
with imperfect information and evolving degrees of market power. Firms in the model set prices according to 
routines, and try to make profits by capturing market share. The model can be extended to deal with heterogeneous 
costs and technological advance. The demand side of the market is composed of boundedly rational consumers who 
are capable of adapting to changing market options. Supply-demand interactions can be represented through a 
population dynamics model from which prices and market structures emerge. We obtain closed-form and simulation 
results which we interpret and compare with benchmark results from a standard non-cooperative game (Bertrand). 
When we compare the results with the Bertrand setting, we find a surprising result. Whereas in the fully rational 
Bertrand setting, firms either lower prices and erode their extra profits, or try to cooperate in a collusive equilibrium 
that is detrimental for consumer welfare, in the evolutionary setting firms make substantial profits, compete by 
adjusting prices, and the dynamics improve consumer welfare. From these results we claim that, instead of treating 
market power, externalities, and asymmetric information as market failures, we should consider them as essential 
traits of market competition. We argue that neo-Schumpeterian models incorporate all of these features together, 
thus leading towards a more realistic price theory for market economies. 
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From an empirical point of view, it has become increasingly clear that the standard assumptions of 
neoclassical economic theory are unnecessarily restrictive for studying market economies (Dosi et al. 
2016, Dosi et al. 2017, Nelson 2018). Thus, assuming intertemporal rationality of representative agents, 
perfect (or even probabilistic) access to endogenously changing knowledge, or industrial change from the 
perspective of static games or equilibrium models is far from satisfactory. In this respect, over the last 
four decades a number of theorists have been searching for a new approach to economic analysis that 
draws on the dynamics of evolutionary models (Nelson and Winter 1982, Dosi et al. 1988, Weibull 1995, 
Metcalfe 1998, Witt 2003, Dopfer et al. 2005, Fatas-Villafranca et al. 2009, Sandholm 2010). Meanwhile, 
both evolutionary authors (Nelson 2013) and neoclassical industrial organization theorists (Tirole 1988, 
Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, Hart and Mas-Colell 2003) have insisted on the challenges we still face when 
trying to understand price formation and markets in modern economies. 
Of course, price formation and market outcomes have been persistent themes in standard economic theory 
(Arrow and Debreu 1954, Debreu 1959, Arrow and Hahn 1971 from a neo-Walrasian perspective; 
Friedman 1962 or Stigler 1966 in neo-Marshallian frames; Lucas and Prescott 1971, and Stokey, Lucas 
and Prescott 1989 within the new classical approach to macroeconomics, just to name the classics). 
Likewise, price formation has been a recurrent theme in standard game theory ever since von Neumann 
and Morgenstern 1944, Nash 1950, Shubik 1959 and refinements in Harsanyi and Selten 1988 and Van 
Damme 1987, up until recent evolutionary games (Weibull 1995, Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998, Sandholm 
2010). The interest in exploring price dynamics and changing market structures has also been a 
distinguishing feature of evolutionary economics (Markey-Towler 2016, Bloch and Metcalfe 2018). 
Nevertheless, even though advances have been achieved, it is well-known that the search for more realistic 
explanations of price formation and market dynamics is still an open issue in economic theory (Vives 
2001, Gallegati et al. 2017). 
In this paper, we aim at contributing to the theory of price formation in one sector (one industry) models 
from an evolutionary perspective. In the evolutionary model we propose, we incorporate market 
competition and endogenous price formation within a setting in which boundedly rational firms (Simon 
1965) and consumer learning (Witt 2001) play key roles. We consider profit-seeking firms that administer 
prices according to alternative mark-up routines and try to capture market share (Kalecki 1971, Winter 
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1984). On the other side of the market, we model strategic interactions among a large mass of anonymous 
consumers (Sandholm 2010). Consumers in the model are characterized by inertia, myopia, and a clear 
intention to improve their choices through the discovery of cheaper options. Thus, our population of 
heterogeneous consumers learn and adapt to the market by gradually discovering better prices. In turn, 
demand transformations are asymmetrically perceived by firms, which endogenously change their prices 
and receive ever-changing profits and market shares. Firms update their supplies to the perceived 
evolution of demand, and consumers react accordingly. These demand-supply dynamic feedbacks drive 
an evolutionary process of market competition, which we represent in a tractable model. The process that 
we obtain resembles the complex approach to markets put forward by Hayek (1948) to a certain extent; 
an approach in which market competition was conceived as an ongoing discovery process.  
Of course we know that, apart from pricing, there are other dimensions that are crucial in market 
competition. To this regard, we incorporate (as an extension of the basic tractable setting) a wider version 
of the model in which cost-heterogeneous firms underlying technological advance compete by holding 
specific mark-up pricing routines. The complete analysis of the complexities that arise in this extension 
of the model exceeds the scope of a single paper. Nevertheless, drawing upon the extended version of the 
model, we point out potential lines of research that may inspire theoretical and empirical works from neo-
Schumpeterian perspectives. 
An important aim of this paper is to vindicate the possibility of approaching evolutionary processes 
through the analysis of not-too-complicated models. In fact, in spite of the attractive features of the 
enriched version of the model in Section 5, we would like to emphasize the analytical virtues of the simpler 
setting in Section 3. For instance, the simple approach allows us to obtain genuinely evolutionary closed-
form propositions that are directly comparable with their neoclassical counterparts (see Section 4). 
Likewise, the tractable versions of our model (Sections 3 and 5.1) may be more accessible to non-
evolutionary scholars and, at the same time, may serve as a well-understandable platform towards more 
complicated models that can be used by our neo-Schumpeterian colleagues (Section 5.2).  
As an illustration of what we mean by engaging scholars from different streams in the discussion, we 
analyze our evolutionary model of pricing and industrial dynamics by comparing it with a neoclassical 
pricing exemplar conveniently parameterized for the occasion. The neoclassical benchmark that we use 
in this paper is the fully-rational perfect knowledge Bertrand game. We analyze this game in its one-shot 
version, and in its long-run repeated variant. Once we have compared the results in the simple evolutionary 
setting with the Bertrand game, then we move towards a comparison with the enriched evolutionary 
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version (including the generalized case of “n” firms and such neo-Schumpeterian features as cost 
heterogeneity and technological advance). 
An interesting result in the paper is that, whereas in the Bertrand setting firms either mutually destroy their 
extra-profits or try to collude in a welfare-eroding state, in the evolutionary setting firms make substantial 
extra profits and tend to adapt prices to ongoing change, while the market generates higher levels of social 
welfare. Another interesting result is that the model outcomes are qualitatively robust to variations in the 
specific versions of the mark-up pricing rules and in the number of firms. The robustness of the results 
and the outcomes of the comparative exercises lead us to argue that, perhaps, instead of treating (as is 
usual in standard economics) market power, asymmetric information, uncertainty, and externalities as 
market failures, we should tackle them instead, treating them as essential traits driving markets in the real 
world. We believe that this comparative analytical approach enriches our understanding of price formation 
and market processes. Likewise, we consider that the effort we have made to generalize the analysis in a 
step by step manner widens the potential paths for future theoretical and empirical works.  
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we present the basic setting of our evolutionary model for 
a market process with endogenously changing demand, supply, and pricing. In Section 3, we carry out the 
dynamic analysis of the model for the cases of dynamic duopolies and oligopolies with constant unit costs. 
As a benchmark against which we can compare the positive and normative results of the evolutionary 
model, we then analyze a version of the Bertrand non-cooperative game in Section 4. We discuss the 
Bertrand model in a one-shot variant, and in a repeated long-run version. We find very different 
implications when we compare the Bertrand results with those of the basic evolutionary model. Then, in 
Section 5, we propose an extension of the evolutionary model that considers cost-heterogeneous firms 
underlying technological advance. We also consider the general case of more than three firms. We 
compare the new results in the extended version with those obtained in previous sections. Finally, in 
Section 6, we synthesize our conclusions and propose future research. 
 
2 An evolutionary model 
2.1 Basic setting and supply-side assumptions 
We consider an industry composed of 𝑛𝑛  firms  (𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . ,𝑛𝑛) that offer (almost) perfect substitute 
varieties of a good or service. Firms compete in prices, with the price of each firm being 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡). Consumers 
are boundedly-rational, imperfectly informed, and myopic (Sandholm 2010), and behave according to 
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certain inertias in consumption (Nelson 2013), that is to say, they are not revising (in fact they cannot 
revise) the relative price of their firm provider in comparison with those of the rivals all the time. Having 
said that, consumers learn from the market, adapt to the new landscape, and can gradually revise their 
consumption options by looking for better prices. 
We assume that, at any time t, there is a mass of consumers distributed among a finite number (𝑛𝑛) of firms, 
and thus paying the corresponding firm price and buying the corresponding product. We assume that the 
size of the industry is constant 𝑄𝑄 > 0, and the initial distribution of market shares (initial distribution of 
the consumers’ mass) among the 𝑛𝑛 firms is: {𝑠𝑠1(0), . . . , 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛(0)}. We assume that each consumer buys one 
unit of product at any time at the corresponding price 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)fixed by i-firm at t. We also consider that 
consumers need to buy the good continuously (it is a final consumption good such as bread, food, clothes, 
mineral water, or specific consumption services). 
Regarding supply, we assume that the firms produce according to a production function in which the only 
input is labor, 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡), with productivity being common among firms, and constant and equal to 
one (we will relax this assumption later on). For the sake of simplicity, we exclude the problems related 
to capital and we assume that labor is paid a salary 𝑤𝑤 (which we use as a numerairy) and we set the wage 
𝑤𝑤 = 1. For this reason, and given that we are not considering productivity differentials in this basic setting, 
the unit cost of production of all the firms will be 𝑐𝑐 = 𝑤𝑤 = 1 (we extend the model for the case of 
heterogeneous innovative firms in Section 5). The preceding assumptions allow us to define the profits of 
each firm 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . ,𝑛𝑛 as:  
𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) − 1)𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑄𝑄, and the rate of normalized profitability: 
 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) − 1)𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡),    𝑖𝑖 = 1, . . . ,𝑛𝑛. (1) 
We assume that firms are boundedly-rational (profit-seekers instead of profit-maximizers) and they fix 
their prices. Of course, looking at (1) we see that firms have an incentive to fix high prices and increase 
profitability. Nevertheless, those firms with higher prices may lose market share, and this effect reduces 
profits (see (1)). Thus, each firm faces a specific trade-off between increasing prices (to raise profits) or 
lowering prices to maintain or gain market share (which also raises profits). This trade-off is a crucial 
permanent concern that influences choice from our boundedly-rational firms.  
What is crucial in our evolutionary market is that, since the structure of demand will be endogenously 
changing in an unpredictable way depending on prices, and firms cannot know what their rivals’ behaviors 
or consumers’ reactions will be, each organization must administer its own price in real time. We consider 
that firms set prices according to specific routines that endogenously depend on the evolving market 
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shares. Following Bloch and Metcalfe (2018), we propose mark-up pricing routines that adapt to each 
firm’s demand and to considering the firm unit cost.  
More precisely, we assume that firms adaptively vary prices by applying a mark-up on the unit cost 
c=w=1with the mark-up being dependent on the changing market shares. We use the following plausible 
routines, which are compatible with the theory of mark-up pricing in the literature (Bloch and Metcalfe 




,    𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 > 1,    𝑖𝑖 = 1, . . . ,𝑛𝑛. (2) 
 𝑝𝑝�𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = (1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡))𝑐𝑐,    𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 > 0,    𝑖𝑖 = 1, . . . ,𝑛𝑛. (3) 




,    𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 > 1,    𝑖𝑖 = 1, . . . ,𝑛𝑛. (4) 
 𝑝𝑝�𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡),    𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 > 0,    𝑖𝑖 = 1, . . . ,𝑛𝑛. (5) 
Note also that both pricing-rules2 capture the idea that, the higher the market share of each firm i, the 
more solid the firm feels in the market, and the higher the margin it is going to charge (thus trying to 
increase normalized profitability). On the other hand, as firms perceive that they get lower market shares, 
they react by reducing prices. Note that both expressions (4) and (5) guarantee positive profits; that is to 
say, the firms’ competition to dominate the market and gain increasing profits depends on capturing 
market share. As we will see below, our boundedly-rational consumers learn and engender an ever-
changing endogenous distribution of market shares, which drive the unpredictable evolution of demand. 
Regarding the parameters in the pricing routines (2) to (5), those firms with low values of 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 or high 
values of 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 are more reactive to changes in market shares. There is a clear relationship between the 
underlying organizational determinants of these parameters in our setting, organizational inertias, and the 
concept of firm routines in Nelson and Winter 1982; and Winter 1971. 
Finally, we assume that once the firms fix prices—according to (4), (5)—then their production levels and 
supplies adapt to the reaction of the distribution of market shares (see below), so that, once firms have set 
and announced their prices, the consumption game we establish below will determine the dynamics 
of 𝑠𝑠i(𝑡𝑡) and, consequently, the necessary production levels of each firm, their profits, the endogenous 
evolution of prices, and the Herfindahl index. Of course, as demand changes, the firms adapt their prices 
and then demand will react accordingly, thus producing a new change in prices, shares, and profits, and 
                                                     
2 Although, from an economic point of view, both routines are different, when analyzed mathematically we can see that the routine of equation (3) is the 
development of the first order Taylor series expansion (until the first derivative) of the routine of equation (2) taking α𝑖𝑖 = 1/𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 and, thus, the stability of  
the system will be the same whichever price routine is followed. 
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so on.  
As the sum of market shares is always equal to one, one of the shares can be obtained from the dynamics 
of the remaining ones, 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) = 1 − 𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑠𝑠2(𝑡𝑡)−. . .−𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛−1(𝑡𝑡). Therefore, we can formally work in the 
(n-1) dimensional simplex. Finally, we shall suppose that the supply of labor is infinitely elastic so that 
employment is reallocated flexibly between firms in agreement with the needs of production dictated by 
the demand of each firm. In Fatas-Villafranca et al. (2009) we indicate ways to relax this assumption in 
an evolutionary computational model. 
 
2.2 Demand-side assumptions and market interactions 
We will state the assumptions underlying demand and market interactions in the model. As we are working 
with a price-setting model, which influences demand, and then, subsequently, demand reacts and drives 
the re-arrangement of prices according to (4) or (5), and everything occurs within a sector with a constant 
size, the demand and demand variation rates for each firm will be given by the dynamics of market shares 
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡). Here is where we will introduce the fundamental assumptions underlying consumer behavior. We 
assume that there is a constant large mass of consumers—equal to the size of the market (𝑄𝑄 > 0)—
distributed in their purchasing decisions amongst the 𝑖𝑖 = 1, . . . ,𝑛𝑛 firms that exist in the industry. At any 
time 𝑡𝑡, the proportion of consumers demanding the product variety of firm i at price 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) set by the firm 
is 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡). 
We assume that the consumption of the good produced in this industry does not saturate the budgetary 
restrictions of consumers who, besides their salaries, may also have other incomes or may spend in other 
markets. Thus, we rule out income effects and general equilibrium effects. 
The 𝑛𝑛 firms in the market (with different prices) represent, from the consumers’ point of view, the 𝑛𝑛 
alternative buying strategies. In our evolutionary model, instead of assuming that all consumers carefully 
observe the whole range of options, place them in order according to prices, and then buy the cheapest 
one, we consider that, given an initial distribution of choices (market shares) (𝑠𝑠i(0)) , 𝑖𝑖 = 1, . . . ,𝑛𝑛, 
consumers will revise (or may revise) their strategies (consumption option) from time to time, and that 
they do this in an environment of imperfect information. More precisely, we consider that consumers 
interact randomly with other consumers who have distinct options, and they communicate and share 
market information that eventually leads to behavioral changes as the market plays out dynamically. 
Formally, we assume that consumers aim to buy at lower prices, and they gradually discover information 
and decide to revise their consumption options. For clarity, we assume that the consumers’ payoffs for 
8 
 
each strategy/firm (consumption option) are given by: 
 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = −𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡),        𝑖𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑛. (6) 
Equation (6) just captures the idea that consumers wish to buy products as cheaply as possible. Hence, we 
propose that the boundedly rational consumers will gradually try to discover cheaper varieties of the good, 
but always depart from specific initial conditions and deploy their action in a path-dependent way. This 
assumption, which is in agreement with a revision protocol we shall now present, will drive the 
endogenous evolution of demand and the bidirectional relations linking unpredictable demand change and 
firms’ pricing. 
Revision protocol: We assume a pairwise random matching mechanism between consumers with the 
probability of consumer meetings in the market being proportional to the firm’s market shares (i.e. to the 
proportions of consumers buying 𝑖𝑖 or j at any time), so that, the probability that those consumers who are 
consuming varieties 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 at any time (with 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, …𝑛𝑛) may meet and communicate is proportional 
to the size of the groups of consumers, 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡), with 0 < 𝛽𝛽 < 1 being a parameter indicating the 
easiness or difficulty of the meetings coming about. Parameter 𝛽𝛽 measures the intensity of competition 
in the sector. To complete the revision protocol we must set a switching-function. We state that the flow 
of consumers, after meeting randomly, may revise their consumption options (the variety of the good they 
buy, i.e. the firm they buy from) from j to i at t, will be denoted by 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡), and we define the switching 
revision process as follows: 
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡) = max{𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡); 0} = max{𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡); 0}. As a consequence of this we have:  
 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) (7) 
With this type of revision protocol embedded in the market process of discovery, we assure that the flow 
of consumers always operates towards the cheaper varieties, as consumers gradually discover and explore 
the range of prices which, in turn, changes endogenously according to pricing routines (4) or (5). Thus, 
we have inertial and myopic consumers who, eventually, randomly meet in pairwise contests, 
communicate in the market, and may decide to migrate from more expensive to cheaper firms. It is crucial 
to mention that, as consumers gradually leave certain firms by moving to other cheaper firms, and 
considering that firms adapt their prices following (4) or (5), consumer migrations generate externalities 
in other consumers (via prices). More precisely, as a certain mass of consumers leave from an expensive 
firm, they force this firm to lower its price. Likewise, as the mass of consumers arrives at a cheaper firm, 
they push the low price of this firm upwards. As we will see below, these migrations with externalities are 
essential to understanding the equilibrating process that drives the market in the model. Having said that, 
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and considering pairwise random matchings, it is clear that, in continuous time, the evolution of each firm 
i’s market share—i.e. the evolution of the proportion of consumers buying from firm i (players playing 




𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)(𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)) = �
𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=1
𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)(𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)) = 
= 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)∑𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)(𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)). (8) 
Defining the average price as ?̅?𝑝(𝑡𝑡) = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) we see that the evolution of the market will be: 
 ?̇?𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)(?̅?𝑝(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)),      𝑖𝑖 = 1, . . . ,𝑛𝑛.          (9) 
with 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)being given by the pricing routines of equations (4) and/or (5) as necessary. Notice that 
equations (1), (4), (5), and (9) fully represent an evolutionary market with endogenously changing prices, 
market shares, concentration index, profits, and levels of consumer satisfaction (see the payoffs in (6)). 
The replicator dynamics in (9) are the core representation of our market. The prices (the fitness levels) 
change endogenously in a way that makes the properties that may emerge from (9) not obvious at all. 
In order to study these dynamics, we devote subsection 3.1 to carrying out, first, the dynamic analysis for 
the duopoly case. Then, in subsection 3.2, we will focus on a three-firm setting as a representation of the 
dynamic oligopoly case. Later on, in Section 4, we will explore a Bertrand-pricing (one-sector) game as a 
neoclassical benchmark against which we will be able to compare our evolutionary results. Finally, in 
Section 5, we will extend the model to the case of cost-heterogeneous firms bringing about technological 
advance. How to extend the model for more than three firms will also be discussed. 
 
3 Dynamic Analysis 
3.1 Duopoly 
In order to study the model, first we carry out a stability analysis for the evolution of the dynamic-duopoly 
case (we fix n = 2 in our evolutionary model). We first detect the resting points, characterize their stability, 
and interpret the overall dynamics of the market. We obtain results regarding market concentration, profits 
and consumer welfare. In the n = 2 case, since the market share of the second firm, 𝑠𝑠2(𝑡𝑡), can be written 
as a function of the first firm’s share, 𝑠𝑠2(𝑡𝑡) = 1 − 𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡), the market will be driven by just one equation: 
 ?̇?𝑠1(𝑡𝑡) = 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡)(1 − 𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡))(𝑝𝑝2(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑝𝑝1(𝑡𝑡)). (10) 
3.1.1 Stability 
Equation (10) clearly shows that the firm with a lower price at any time tends to gain market share. As we 
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have said, firms administer their prices (equations (4) and (5)) according to the perceived evolution of 
demand (market share). Therefore, apart from equation (10) driving market competition, and equation (1) 
in which we see profit evolution, we need to incorporate the pricing equations (4) and (5) to study the 
stability and dynamics of the market. We shall study the stability of the replicator dynamics (10), taking 
first the pricing routines of equation (4), and then those of equation (5). Thus, from (4) and (10), we obtain:  






This equation (11) has three critical points, 𝑠𝑠1 = 0, 𝑠𝑠1 = 1 and  𝑠𝑠1 =
𝜂𝜂1
𝜂𝜂1+𝜂𝜂2
. The critical points 𝑠𝑠1 =
0, 𝑠𝑠1 = 1 represent situations of monopoly, while 𝑠𝑠1 =
𝜂𝜂1
𝜂𝜂1+𝜂𝜂2
, with 𝑠𝑠2 =
𝜂𝜂2
𝜂𝜂1+𝜂𝜂2
 represents a situation of 
duopoly with the two firms sharing the market depending on their pricing routines. More precisely, if we 
rewrite (4) as ?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) =
1
1−𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖/𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
,    𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 > 1,    𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, we see that 1/𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 can be interpreted as the propensity 
to change price when adapting prices to variations in market share. Thus, parameter 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 could be seen as 
the inertia of firm i when re-setting prices adapting to changing demand. The higher the value of 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖, the 
lower the price-reactivity of firm i to its changing market share. It is interesting that, at the critical point 






 (both firms end up sharing the market), the more inertial firm (the one 
less volatile in adapting prices to demand) is the one with a higher market share. 




and in ?̂?𝑠0 ∈ �
𝜂𝜂1
𝜂𝜂1+𝜂𝜂2
, 1�. We see that 𝑓𝑓(?̅?𝑠0) > 0 and 𝑓𝑓(?̂?𝑠0) < 0, and, thus, points 𝑠𝑠1 = 0 and 𝑠𝑠1 = 1 are 
unstable, while point 𝑠𝑠1 =
𝜂𝜂1
𝜂𝜂1+𝜂𝜂2
 is stable. This can be seen in a graphic representation for stability in 
Figure 1. This analysis tells us that any route 𝑠𝑠1∗(𝑡𝑡) with 𝑠𝑠1∗(0) ≠ 1 and 𝑠𝑠1∗(0) ≠ 0 will tend, when 𝑡𝑡 →
∞, to lim𝑡𝑡→∞𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡) =
𝜂𝜂1
𝜂𝜂1+𝜂𝜂2
. Therefore, the third critical point at which both firms end up with identical 






, is the stable limit situation of the market process—




Figure 1. Stability for differential equation (11). 
 
If we take the pricing routine of equation (5) now, the replicator dynamics are: 
 ?̇?𝑠1(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑓𝑓(𝑠𝑠1) = 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡)(1 − 𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡))(𝛼𝛼2(1 − 𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡)) − 𝛼𝛼1𝑠𝑠1) (12) 
The critical points of this equation are 𝑠𝑠1 = 0, 𝑠𝑠1 = 1 and 𝑠𝑠1 =
𝛼𝛼2
𝛼𝛼1+𝛼𝛼2
. We proceed in a similar way to 
the previous case and we evaluate the function for ?̅?𝑠0 ∈ �0,
𝛼𝛼2
𝛼𝛼1+𝛼𝛼2
� and for ?̂?𝑠0 ∈ �
𝛼𝛼2
𝛼𝛼1+𝛼𝛼2
, 1�. We can see 




stable. Here again we find that the firm with a less reactive (more inertial) pricing routine is the one that 
ends up controlling a higher share of the market. The graphical representation of stability is analogous to 
that of Figure 1. Therefore, for both pricing routines, we find that the interior critical stationary state of 
the market is the asymptotically stable state. The stabilities of the results for both routines are similar as 
we could have supposed since we have already proved that one of the routines is the first-order Taylor 
expansion of the other. 
 
3.1.2 Equilibria, profitability, consumers’ payoff, and market structure 
As a consequence of the results in 3.1.1, we are going to focus now on the asymptotically stable state, and 
we shall obtain and interpret further characteristics of this market situation. We have seen that, for the 




�  and for those of 




�. Starting out from these results, we can see what the normalized 
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profitability is for firms, the consumers’ pay-offs, and the Herfindahl index.  
 
Normalized profitability  
Remember that normalized profitability is given by equation (1) such that:  
 𝜋𝜋�𝑖𝑖∗ = (?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ − 1)?̂?𝑠𝑖𝑖∗ = �
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖−?̂?𝑠𝑖𝑖












    = 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖+𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗)(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖+𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗−1)
, (13) 





As we see in (13) and (14), in the emergent stable situation of the market, both firms make extra profits 
for both pricing routines. Both firms end up fixing equal prices in the endogenously emergent limit market 
state, and both firms have similar unit costs (equal to 1). Then, we see from equations (13) and (14) that 
the firm that ends up being more profitable (although both of them make positive extra profits) is the one 
with higher-limit market share; the most profitable firm in the limit-state of the market will be the one that 
is less sensitive to changing demand in the administration of its pricing routine. 
Of course, full-rigidity is not a realistic case since price fine tuning is the crucial mechanism underlying 
the transient dynamic process out of equilibrium. But it remains clear that being sufficiently inertial (not 
changing in a highly-reactive way) is a plus in the final equilibrium state. 
 
Consumer payoffs 
In our model, notice that the payoff for consumers is given by equation (6). Then, in the limit market state 
of the dynamic duopoly, the payoff gained by consumers buying from either firm 1 or firm 2 must be the 
same, 𝑢𝑢1∗ = 𝑢𝑢2∗ . This is indeed the case, since we have already seen that prices in the asymptotically stable 
market state tend to be identical, otherwise, consumers would gradually find (according to the learning 
revision protocol) a cheaper option and the shares would change. This is something that does not happen 
at the stable resting point, although it is continuously happening in the path-dependent paths converging 
towards the stable state. The stable state is an emergent limit property of our evolving industry, in which 
consumers have exhausted the search opportunities in the market, firms have set identical prices, and both 
groups of customers earn a payoff 𝑢𝑢1∗ = 𝑢𝑢2∗ = 𝑢𝑢∗ = −𝑝𝑝∗ ,with 𝑝𝑝∗denoting the identical firm-price in 
equilibrium (adding a hat or tilde according to the price routine we are considering). Thus, we have: 
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It is worth noticing that the criteria for increasing consumer-payoff (low prices) goes in the opposite 
direction to the criteria for increasing firm profits (high prices). Setting out from initial and parametric 
conditions, the market process operates through the equilibrating role of consumer migration looking for 
low prices, externalities of consumer migrations upon other consumers, new migrations leading to firm 
prices being updated, new prices signaling new opportunities, and unchaining new consumer migrations. 
This process tends towards a limit-state in which both firms make extra profits. They do so by fixing an 
(identical) level of prices. 
 
Herfindahl index 
Finally, in the evolutionary duopoly case, the Herfindahl index in the equilibrium is given by 𝐻𝐻 = 𝑠𝑠1∗2 +
𝑠𝑠2∗2. Thus, substituting different 𝑠𝑠∗according to the price routines:  
 



























The Herfindahl index is at a minimum when it is equal to 1/𝑛𝑛, in our case 1/2, which is produced when 
both firms have the same market share. This minimum value is reached if and only if firms have the same 
price-routine parameters, that is, 𝜂𝜂1 = 𝜂𝜂2 for the first price routine and 𝛼𝛼1 = 𝛼𝛼2 for the second one. In an 
evolutionary world this is an extremely rare event. Behavioral diversity and heterogeneous organizational 
conditions are the regular norm, so we should not expect the appearance of perfectly symmetric markets 
to be frequent. We will dig deeper into the role of firm heterogeneity in Section 5. For the time being, let 
us remark that the model dynamics rule out the possibility of H being one (monopoly, its maximum value) 
since we have proved that those are unstable states of the market. 
 
3.2 Oligopoly 
We shall focus now on the case of three firms competing in the sector. This is closer to a typical oligopoly 
case. The results reinforce the generality of the properties obtained above. As with the case of the duopoly, 
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analyzing the market share of two of the firms will be sufficient, as the third firm’s share will be an 
expression of the other two firms, 𝑠𝑠3(𝑡𝑡) = 1 − 𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑠𝑠2(𝑡𝑡). Hence the market dynamics in this n=3 
oligopoly case will be reduced to a system of two ordinary differential equations: 
?̇?𝑠1(𝑡𝑡) = 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡)[𝑠𝑠2(𝑡𝑡)(𝑝𝑝2(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑝𝑝1(𝑡𝑡)) + (1 − 𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑠𝑠2(𝑡𝑡))(𝑝𝑝3(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑝𝑝1(𝑡𝑡))]; 
?̇?𝑠2(𝑡𝑡) = 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠2(𝑡𝑡)[𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡)(𝑝𝑝1(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑝𝑝2(𝑡𝑡)) + (1 − 𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑠𝑠2(𝑡𝑡))(𝑝𝑝3(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑝𝑝2(𝑡𝑡))]. 
As before, the final dynamic system we obtain will depend on the pricing routines chosen. For the price 
routine of equation (4) we see: 
 

























and for the price routine of equation (5) we see: 
?̇?𝑠1(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑓𝑓1(𝑠𝑠1, 𝑠𝑠2) = 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡)[𝑠𝑠2(𝑡𝑡)(𝛼𝛼2𝑠𝑠2(𝑡𝑡) − 𝛼𝛼1𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡)) +
+(1 − 𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑠𝑠2(𝑡𝑡))(𝛼𝛼3(1− 𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑠𝑠2(𝑡𝑡)) − 𝛼𝛼1𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡))];
?̇?𝑠2(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑓𝑓2(𝑠𝑠1, 𝑠𝑠2) = 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠2(𝑡𝑡)[𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡)(𝛼𝛼1𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡) − 𝛼𝛼2𝑠𝑠2(𝑡𝑡)) +
+(1 − 𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑠𝑠2(𝑡𝑡))(𝛼𝛼3(1− 𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑠𝑠2(𝑡𝑡)) − 𝛼𝛼2𝑠𝑠2(𝑡𝑡))]
(20) 
As we have seen in 3.1, as certain masses of consumers learn and revise their options in continuous time, 
they can operate as stabilizers of the market. These consumer flows induce expensive firms to lower their 
prices and allow for cheaper firms to increase their prices. This equilibrating process drives the price 
vector in real time, which results from market self-organization and does not come from any fictitious 
auctioneer operating in the vacuum. It is the outcome of step-by-step learning and trading, and endogenous 
adaptations of consumers and firms in continuous time, which underlie the ongoing evolutionary process. 
 
3.2.1 Stability 
We begin the exploration by analyzing the stability characteristics of dynamic systems (19) and (20). 
For the first dynamic system (19), we obtain the following critical points: ?̂?𝐴 = (0,0), 𝐵𝐵� = (0,1), ?̂?𝐶 =
�0, 𝜂𝜂2
𝜂𝜂2+𝜂𝜂3
� ,𝐷𝐷� = (1,0),𝐸𝐸� = � 𝜂𝜂1
𝜂𝜂1+𝜂𝜂3








� . The points 
















� is a resting point at which the three firms in the oligopoly share the market according 
to (normally) different limit market shares 𝑠𝑠i =
𝜂𝜂i
𝜂𝜂1+𝜂𝜂2+𝜂𝜂3
, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,3. To see the local stability at each 
point, we calculate the Jacobian matrix of 𝑓𝑓(𝑠𝑠1, 𝑠𝑠2) = (𝑓𝑓1(𝑠𝑠1, 𝑠𝑠2),𝑓𝑓2(𝑠𝑠1, 𝑠𝑠2)), we evaluate it at each point, 
and we study its eigenvalues and eigenvectors. We achieved the following results:  
• ?̂?𝐴 = (0,0). The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are equal and positive, 𝜆𝜆1 = 𝜆𝜆2 =
𝛽𝛽
𝜂𝜂3−1
> 0 and the eigenvectors are 𝑣𝑣1 = (1,0), 𝑣𝑣2 = (0,1). Thus we are faced with an unstable 
point from which trajectories point out in all directions.  
 




and the eigenvectors are 𝑣𝑣1 = (1,0) , 𝑣𝑣2 = (0,1) . This gives an unstable point from which 
trajectories point out in all directions.  
 
• ?̂?𝐶 = (0, 𝜂𝜂2
𝜂𝜂2+𝜂𝜂3
). The eigenvalues are 𝜆𝜆1 =
𝛽𝛽
𝜂𝜂2+𝜂𝜂3−1
> 0 and 𝜆𝜆2 =
−𝛽𝛽(𝜂𝜂2+𝜂𝜂3)
(𝜂𝜂2+𝜂𝜂3−1)2
< 0. With 
associated eigenvectors 𝑣𝑣1 = (
−𝜂𝜂2−𝜂𝜂3
𝜂𝜂2
, 1) and 𝑣𝑣2 = (0,1). Thus, it is a saddle point the attracting 
vector of which is 𝑣𝑣2. 
 
• 𝐷𝐷� = (1,0). The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are equal and positive, 𝜆𝜆1 = 𝜆𝜆2 =
𝛽𝛽
𝜂𝜂1−1
> 0 and the eigenvectors are 𝑣𝑣1 = (1,0), 𝑣𝑣2 = (0,1). Once again, we have an unstable point. 
Notice that the monopoly situations are three unstable market states. 
 
• 𝐸𝐸� = � 𝜂𝜂1
𝜂𝜂1+𝜂𝜂3
, 0�. The eigenvalues are 𝜆𝜆1 =
𝛽𝛽
𝜂𝜂1+𝜂𝜂3−1
> 0 and 𝜆𝜆2 =
−𝛽𝛽(𝜂𝜂1+𝜂𝜂3)
(𝜂𝜂1+𝜂𝜂3−1)2
< 0. With 
eigenvectors 𝑣𝑣1 = (
−𝜂𝜂1
𝜂𝜂1+𝜂𝜂3
, 1) and 𝑣𝑣2 = (1,0). A saddle point the attracting vector of which is 𝑣𝑣2. 
 




� . The eigenvalues are  𝜆𝜆1 =
𝛽𝛽
𝜂𝜂1+𝜂𝜂2−1
> 0 and  𝜆𝜆2 =
−𝛽𝛽(𝜂𝜂1+𝜂𝜂2)
(𝜂𝜂1+𝜂𝜂2−1)2
< 0 . 
With associated eigenvectors  𝑣𝑣1 = (
𝜂𝜂1
𝜂𝜂2
, 1)  and 𝑣𝑣2 = (−1,1) . Thus, it is a saddle point with 
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attracting vector 𝑣𝑣2. Notice that the duopoly resting points are unstable saddle points. 




� . The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are equal and 
negative, 𝜆𝜆1 = 𝜆𝜆2 =
−𝛽𝛽(𝜂𝜂1+𝜂𝜂2+𝜂𝜂3)
𝜂𝜂1+𝜂𝜂2+𝜂𝜂3−1
< 0 and the eigenvectors are 𝑣𝑣1 = (1,0) , 𝑣𝑣2 = (0,1) , an 
asymptotically stable point to which trajectories arrive from all directions. Thus, the 𝐺𝐺� point at 
which the three firms survive is the stable point towards which the equilibrating market process in 
our evolutionary model (with bounded rationality, imperfect information, externalities, evolving 
market power, pricing and learning) leads the system. 
We can graphically depict (for a representative parametric setting) 3  the dynamics, which we have 
formally obtained above, in Figure 2. We take as parameter values 𝛽𝛽 = 0.5, 𝜂𝜂1 = 1.1, 𝜂𝜂2 = 1.4 and 
𝜂𝜂3 = 1.2, in such a way that the critical points in terms of firm market shares are: ?̂?𝐴 = (0,0), 𝐵𝐵� = (0,1), 
?̂?𝐶 = (0,0.538), 𝐷𝐷� = (1,0), 𝐸𝐸� = (0.478,0), 𝐹𝐹� = (0.44,0.56) and 𝐺𝐺� = (0.297,0.378). 
 
Figure 2. Phase diagram for the replicator dynamics (19). On the horizontal axis, share of firm 1; vertical axis, share of firm 
2. Parameter values: 𝛽𝛽 = 0.5, 𝜂𝜂1 = 1.1, 𝜂𝜂2 = 1.4 and 𝜂𝜂3 = 1.2. The share of firm 3 is 𝑠𝑠3(𝑡𝑡) = 1 − 𝑠𝑠1(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑠𝑠2(𝑡𝑡). 
 
                                                     
3 The graphical representation was carried out with pplane.m software developed by John C. Polking. For more information, see [Polking and Arnold, 2004]. 
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Thus we can see that there is only one stable point, 𝐺𝐺�. All the trajectories of the system lead towards 𝐺𝐺� 
except those on the boundary of the n-1 dimensional simplex; that is, 1 ≠ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(0) ≠ 0for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2 and 
𝑠𝑠1(0) + 𝑠𝑠2(0) ≠ 1. Note that, in the case of 𝑠𝑠1(0) + 𝑠𝑠2(0) = 1, we would obtain the same results as for 
the duopoly case, with 𝐹𝐹 � being the stable point of this duopoly. Compare to Figure 1. We assume in the 
present oligopoly case that we set out from the interior of the n-1 simplex so that we can focus attention 
on 𝐺𝐺� and the dynamics leading to it.  
 
Now, we shall look at the second market system (20) with alternative pricing routines. We obtain the 
following critical points: ?̃?𝐴 = (0,0) , 𝐵𝐵� = (0,1) , ?̃?𝐶 = (0, 𝛼𝛼3
𝛼𝛼2+𝛼𝛼3
) , 𝐷𝐷� = (1,0) , 𝐸𝐸� = � 𝛼𝛼3
𝛼𝛼1+𝛼𝛼3










To check the stability of the points, we shall use the same method as with the previous case.  
• ?̃?𝐴 = (0,0). The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are equal and positive, 𝜆𝜆1 = 𝜆𝜆2 =
𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼3 > 0 and the eigenvectors are 𝑣𝑣1 = (1,0), 𝑣𝑣2 = (0,1). We have an unstable point from which 
trajectories start out in all directions. 
 
• 𝐵𝐵� = (0,1). The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are equal and positive, 𝜆𝜆1 = 𝜆𝜆2 =
𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼2 > 0 and the eigenvectors are 𝑣𝑣1 = (1,0), 𝑣𝑣2 = (0,1). We have an unstable point from which 
trajectories start out in all directions. 
 
• ?̃?𝐶 = (0, 𝛼𝛼3
𝛼𝛼2+𝛼𝛼3
) . Eigenvalues are 𝜆𝜆1 =
𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼2𝛼𝛼3
𝛼𝛼2+𝛼𝛼3
> 0  and 𝜆𝜆2 =
−𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼2𝛼𝛼3
𝛼𝛼2+𝛼𝛼3)2
< 0 . With 
associated eigenvectors 𝑣𝑣1 = (
𝛼𝛼2+𝛼𝛼3
𝛼𝛼3
,−1) and 𝑣𝑣2 = (0,1). Thus it is a saddle point the attractor 
of which is 𝑣𝑣2. 
 
• 𝐷𝐷� = (1,0). The eigenvalues of the Jacobian are equal and positive, 𝜆𝜆1 = 𝜆𝜆2 = 𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼1 > 0 
and the eigenvectors are 𝑣𝑣1 = (1,0) , 𝑣𝑣2 = (0,1) . We have an unstable point from which 
trajectories set out in all directions. 
 
• 𝐸𝐸� = � 𝛼𝛼3
𝛼𝛼1+𝛼𝛼3
, 0� . The eigenvalues are 𝜆𝜆1 =
𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼1𝛼𝛼3
𝛼𝛼1+𝛼𝛼3
> 0 and 𝜆𝜆2 =
−𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼1𝛼𝛼3
𝛼𝛼1+𝛼𝛼3
< 0 . With 
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associated eigenvectors 𝑣𝑣1 = (
𝛼𝛼3
𝛼𝛼3+𝛼𝛼1
,−1) and 𝑣𝑣2 = (1,0). A saddle point the attractor of which 
is 𝑣𝑣2. 
 




�. The eigenvalues are 𝜆𝜆1 =
𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼1𝛼𝛼2
𝛼𝛼1+𝛼𝛼2
> 0 and 𝜆𝜆2 =
−𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼1𝛼𝛼2
𝛼𝛼1+𝛼𝛼2
< 0. With 
associated eigenvectors 𝑣𝑣1 = (
𝛼𝛼2
𝛼𝛼1
, 1) and 𝑣𝑣2 = (−1,1). A saddle point the attractor of which is 
𝑣𝑣2. 
 








< 0 and the eigenvectors are 𝑣𝑣1 = (1,0), 𝑣𝑣2 = (0,1). A stable point in the 
interior of the 𝑛𝑛 − 1 simplex to which all the trajectories arrive from all directions. 
The graphical representation of the phase diagram is similar to that seen for the other price-setting routine. 
This result reinforces the idea that the model is robust against changes in the specific pricing routines, 
number of firms, and initial conditions and parameters. Therefore, we have one stable point, 𝐺𝐺�, to which 
all the trajectories of the system that are not at the boundary of the n-1 dimensional simplex tend to go,  
that is, that 1 ≠ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(0) ≠ 0 for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2 and 𝑠𝑠1(0) + 𝑠𝑠2(0) ≠ 1. Note that, for the case 𝑠𝑠1(0) + 𝑠𝑠2(0) =
1, we obtain the same results as for the duopoly case. We will now finish this section by looking at the 
concentration levels and offering certain welfare remarks that our model suggests. 
 
3.2.2 Herfindahl index and certain remarks on welfare 
The Herfindahl index in the interior stationary state of our oligopoly case is given by 𝐻𝐻 = 𝑠𝑠1∗2 + 𝑠𝑠2∗2 +
𝑠𝑠3∗2 where 𝑠𝑠1∗2, 𝑠𝑠2∗2 and 𝑠𝑠3∗2are the market shares in the interior equilibrium. Substituting the different 
limit-state shares for the alternative pricing routines, we find: 
𝐻𝐻� = ?̂?𝑠1∗2 + ?̂?𝑠2∗2 + ?̂?𝑠3∗2 = �
𝜂𝜂1


















𝐻𝐻� = ?̃?𝑠1∗2 + ?̃?𝑠2∗2 + ?̃?𝑠3∗2 = �
𝛼𝛼2𝛼𝛼3



















The Herfindahl index in this case will be at a minimum when it is equal to 1/3. This minimum will be 
reached if and only if the firms have the same price-fixing parameters, that is, 𝜂𝜂1 = 𝜂𝜂2 = 𝜂𝜂3 for the first 
price-fixing routine (4), and 𝛼𝛼1 = 𝛼𝛼2 = 𝛼𝛼3 for the second one (5). This is a highly improbable situation. 
Notice also that the monopoly situations in which H=1 can generally be ruled out as unstable points of the 
systems. Therefore, systems (19) and (20) tend to stabilize around a moderate level of industrial 
concentration. Likewise, and given that prices for the three firms must be identical at the interior resting 
point, their profits will depend on market shares. Again, if we assume that firms will differ in routines but 
all of them tend to seek profits (they are not maximizers but profit seekers), if the oligopoly stabilizes at 
an interior resting point, with relatively evenly-distributed shares (Figure 2), then we can easily obtain 
settings in which firms compete with a non-extreme level of industrial concentration, the market provides 
firms with extra-profits, and consumers all get the same payoff at the interior resting point 𝑢𝑢�∗ = −?̂?𝑝∗ or 
𝑢𝑢�∗ = −𝑝𝑝�∗ . Although the final payoff will depend on the limit-prices, we can easily put forward 
configurations in which the limit-price vector and consumer payoffs are not extremely high. In Figure 2, 
for plausible parametric values, we obtain a highly evenly-distributed market (low H) with moderate prices 
in the interior of the n-1 dimensional simplex, positive firm extra profits, and an acceptable level of 
consumer welfare 𝑢𝑢�∗ = −?̂?𝑝∗. 
The results obtained in this Section 3 are the basis from which we can fruitfully compare the evolutionary 
approach to the standard neoclassical static representations (Section 4). Furthermore, the basic setting in 
Section 3 serves as a platform from which we can move (in Section 5) towards generalized versions of the 
model. 
 
4 Our evolutionary model versus the ‘Bertrand’ neoclassical game 
In this section, we adapt the basic evolutionary model seen in the previous sections to compare its results 
with a fully-rational (and perfect knowledge) neoclassical “Bertrand-game”. To this regard, we consider 
two firms that compete in prices, with unitary costs equal to one, and with no significant product 
differences (perfect or almost perfect substitutes). Firms have pricing capacity, the size of the sector is 
constant, and, in normalized terms, we have a firm-specific normalized profit function, which is: 
 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 − 1)𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,    𝑖𝑖 = 1,2 (23) 
Notice that this function (23) is analogous to equation (1). In the Bertrand setting, firms decide their prices, 
but this time they do not decide upon them by using pricing-routines, but by choosing rationally among 
strategies, with perfect information, perfect knowledge of the game, and full knowledge of the complete 
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payoff matrix. Consumers also have perfect information, and are capable of placing the firms’ offers 
(prices on the products) into a complete and consistent order. Then, they buy the product (from the firm) 
with the lowest price. We will adapt parametrically the Bertrand setting to obtain results that can be 
compared directly with those obtained for the alternative pricing routines (4) and (5) in the evolutionary 
setting. We shall focus first on the “one-shot” version of the Bertrand game. 
Thus, we present the payoff matrices of our Bertrand duopoly in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. The 
duopolist 1 is the row player, and duopolist 2 the column player. We can see that it is a prisoners’ dilemma 
type of frame. The strategies available to the duopolists are simply to cooperate (if both cooperate they 
collude and agree on fixing a high price as high as possible, depending on the context), or not cooperate 
(one of them may defect, and, in the extreme case, both can defect). If both firms defect, or even if just 
one of them defects thus breaking the cooperative agreement, then the duopolists unchain a price war to 
capture consumers. As we will see, this situation is an attractive (stable) state in the one-shot game. 
Formally, let’s see what payoff each alternative strategy offers and then we can set the payoff matrices: 
• Both duopolists collude in the market in such a way that they set the same price, thus 
obtaining the same share and identical positive profit, with market shares 𝑠𝑠1 = 𝑠𝑠2 = 0.5, and a 
profit that is higher, the higher the prices on which firms base the cooperative agreement. Since 
firms are fully rational, they may try to fix significantly high prices in the collusive state (with an 
erosion of consumer welfare). We can consider that they agree to set the maximum possible price 
in accordance with the routines (4), (5); i.e. (?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖 =
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖−1
 or 𝑝𝑝�𝑖𝑖 = 1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖). We assume that, because 
of firm homogeneity, both firms have the same price-fixing parameter that now, in a typical 
industrial organization setting, we can consider to be a strategic choice (𝜂𝜂 ≡ 𝜂𝜂1 = 𝜂𝜂2 > 1 or 𝛼𝛼 ≡
𝛼𝛼1 = 𝛼𝛼2 > 0). In the case that we want to compare results with the evolutionary setting from 




. If they use 𝑝𝑝�𝑖𝑖, 𝑝𝑝�1 = 𝑝𝑝�2 = 1 + 𝛼𝛼, they already represent the maximum price that can be 
set from equations (4) or (5). In the collusive state, both firms agree to keep an identical (high) 
price, and thus they split the market share, 𝑠𝑠1 = 𝑠𝑠2 = 0.5 (Tables 1 and 2).  
This is basically a situation with profit-sharing, which leads to normalized profits 𝜋𝜋�1 = 𝜋𝜋�2 =
� 𝜂𝜂
𝜂𝜂−1
− 1� 0.5 = 0.5
𝜂𝜂−1
 or 𝜋𝜋�1 = 𝜋𝜋�2 = (1 + 𝛼𝛼 − 1)0.5 = 0.5𝛼𝛼 , depending on the pricing routine. 
Thus we see that the first cell of the payoff matrix (in Tables 1 or 2), where both firms agree and 
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) if prices are to be comparable with ?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖, and (0.5𝛼𝛼, 0.5𝛼𝛼) if they are set 
so that we can compare them with 𝑝𝑝�𝑖𝑖. 
 
• If the firms betray each other and enter into a price war, they will end up with the same 
prices at the minimum level to capture consumers. Since both firms’ unit cost is one, we have 
𝑝𝑝1 = 𝑝𝑝2 = 1 as the minimum price. Firms make identical profits (null extra profits) 𝜋𝜋1 = 𝜋𝜋2 =
0, such that the fourth cell (bottom right) of the payoff matrices (Tables 1 and 2) will be (0,0). 
• If one of the duopolists unilaterally decides to move away from the agreed-upon colluded 
solution—assuming that the other firm continues to play this solution—then, as demand reacts to 
price in our model, this firm only has to set a price slightly lower than the agreed price to be able 
to corner all the market and make extra-profits. In the case to be compared with routine ?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖, player 
𝑖𝑖, who decides to betray the other one, slightly increases the parameter 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖, so that, we have 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 >





= ?̂?𝑝𝑗𝑗, thus capturing all the market share in the “one-shot” game and 
obtaining a profit 𝜋𝜋�𝑖𝑖 =
1
𝜂𝜂+−1
. The other duopolist must exit the market in the one-shot version 
(represented in Table 1 by 0−). As the game is symmetric, the profits for both duopolists in the 
top right and lower left cells are those in Table 1. In the comparable frame with routine 𝑝𝑝�𝑖𝑖, player 
𝑖𝑖, who decides to betray the other one, will slightly decrease parameter 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, with respect to the 
agreed one (that is, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 𝛼𝛼), 𝑝𝑝�𝑖𝑖 = 1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 1 + 𝛼𝛼 = 𝑝𝑝�𝑗𝑗. In this manner, the firm will reach all the 
market share and will obtain a profit 𝜋𝜋�𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼−. The other duopolist must exit the market. As the 



















, 0−� (0,0) 
 




Note in Table 1 that the non-cooperative (lowest prices by betrayal) “price war” strategy is strongly 




. Actually, this supposition is true if and only if 2𝜂𝜂 −
1 > 𝜂𝜂+. Writing 𝜂𝜂+ = 𝜂𝜂 + 𝜀𝜀 with 𝜀𝜀 > 0 our supposition is fulfilled if 𝜂𝜂 − 1 > 𝜀𝜀. As 𝜂𝜂 > 1, then 𝜀𝜀 will 




 for 𝜂𝜂+ > 𝜂𝜂. Hence we have a Nash-stable equilibrium 
of the game, which is that of price war. Even though more is gained by both firms in the collusive state, 
in the Nash “price war” the Bertrand equilibrium is fully-rational for both firms starting out a price war, 
which will end up in the Bertrand zero extra-profits state. The other situations of the game (it can be shown 
that there are no Nash equilibria for mixed strategies) are those associated with one player cooperating 
while the other does not. However, these states are unstable, and they will lead dynamically to a situation 
where the firm that has not betrayed the other one lowers its price, which would drag the case to the 







Cooperate (0.5𝛼𝛼, 0.5𝛼𝛼) (0−,𝛼𝛼−) 
Defect (𝛼𝛼−, 0−) (0,0) 
 
Table 2. Payoff matrix for routine 𝑝𝑝�𝑖𝑖(0 < 𝛼𝛼− < 𝛼𝛼) 
 
For the matrix in Table 2, once again we see the “defect and the rival reacts by lowering price because of 
betrayal” effect. Defecting from collusion is strongly dominant for both players if we suppose that 𝛼𝛼− >
0.5𝛼𝛼. Actually, writing 𝛼𝛼− = 𝛼𝛼 − 𝜀𝜀 with 𝜀𝜀 > 0, the supposition is reduced to 0.5𝛼𝛼 > 𝜀𝜀, and as 𝛼𝛼 > 0, 
then 𝜀𝜀 will always exist. Thus we see that the (defect, defect) Nash-state is stable and attractive. 
To conclude this comparative exercise, we are going to set out from Table 1 and consider what would be 
the effects on the game if we considered the repeated version (from time “0” to infinity). The situation for 
Table 2 is similar; therefore, we will just carry out the analysis for Table 1. Let us consider for the repeated 
version that the two fully-rational, fully-informed firms have a common discount rate  𝑟𝑟.  Setting out from 
Table 1, we start out from the collusive situation and obtain the result that the incentives to defect in the 
initial period exist. If any one of the two firms performs unilateral defection from collusion, it gains an 
extra profit from betrayal—which we will call the temptation to defect—and (in Table 1) it is equal to 
23 
 
“what the defector can capture as extra-gain if it breaks cooperation unilaterally whereas the other firm 




> 0. This temptation is positive, 
since, as we have seen above, we consider 𝜂𝜂+ > 𝜂𝜂. 
Nonetheless, this gain (the temptation) will only happen in the first period, because defection will generate 
the reaction of the rival, and the game will quickly (and forever) end up in the Nash-stable state, (defect, 
defect): (0,0). Therefore, a punishment appears in the repeated game (we assume the trigger strategy), 
which the potential defector must compare with the temptation so as to decide whether defecting pays or 
not. If temptation is higher than punishment, we will have defection and a price war in the repeated game. 
Punishment means moving from the cooperative solution to the Nash-stable state forever. The potential 






> 0.∞𝑖𝑖=1  
From the previous results, we can obtain the result that temptation is higher than punishment, thus leading 
to a price war, when we have: 1
𝜂𝜂+−1









� > 1 but it is not clear 





� > 1 + 1
𝑟𝑟
  . 
This is the condition for breaking cooperation and entering in a price war. The higher the discount rate 
“r>0”, the more probable it is that the sector ends up in a price war. On the other hand, a value of “r”, 
which is sufficiently low, rules out the price war à la Bertrand, but then it ensures—in the repeated game—
a permanent situation of collusion with prices that are too high and market sharing, a situation that is 
clearly detrimental for consumer welfare. 
It is interesting to remark that, if we compare the evolutionary results with the Bertrand game, we see how 
in the evolutionary model, from both the point of view of firms (which are boundedly rational) and also 
from the point of view of consumers (who gradually learn better price options), we obtain dynamics 
converging to a stable interior equilibrium where firms end up obtaining extra-profits and compete with 
moderate prices, and consumers do not see their welfare eroded by excessively high prices (see the 
generalization in Section 5). By contrast, within the Bertrand game (with full rationality and perfect 
knowledge), firms either do not obtain extra-profits (price war) or, if they maintain a collusive agreement 
with higher prices, then they significantly erode consumer welfare. Now, in Section 5, we are going to 
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extend the evolutionary model for the general case of n firms, and to the case of heterogeneous firm costs 
and technological advance. 
 
5 Extensions of the evolutionary model 
5.1 The general case of “n” firms. 
We first extend the analysis of the evolutionary model composed of equation (9) and the pricing routines 
(4) and (5) to the case of any number of firms (𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑛𝑛). It is crucial to note that, if we had not 
analyzed the model “step by step” and in a comparative manner (as we have done in Sections 3 and 4), it 
would have been impossible to reach the general results we hereby present. The low-dimensional 
comparative analyses provided us with a lot of intuition and preparatory information that we will need 
now. Thus, we will look at the “n” firms general case. We carry out the exhaustive formal analysis for the 
pricing routine (5) (but the results are qualitatively identical for routine (4) since, as we know, routine (5) 
can be reached through a Taylor expansion of (4) and both are almost identical for positive real values 
between “0” and “1”, which is the case of market shares). We have chosen routine (5) here because it 
requires fewer calculations.  
Then, considering equation (9) and the routine (5) we can re-write the model for any n as follows: 
 
 𝑠𝑠𝚤𝚤̇ = 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)[∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)]                        (24) 
  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)  ,   (𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑛𝑛). 
The dynamics of (24) develop on the unit-simplex ∆𝑛𝑛 and both the boundary and the interior of ∆𝑛𝑛 are 
invariant sets (Sandholm 2010). We are going to focus on the interior of the simplex, although, of course, 
it is clear that we still have rest points on the faces, edges, and vertices of the simplex. However, since the 
interior is invariant, and we always run the analysis from initial conditions within the interior of the 
simplex (let us denote this interior by D=Int (∆𝑛𝑛)), we are interested in the existence and stability of 
interior resting points. Moreover, the results obtained for the interior of ∆𝑛𝑛 will be the ones we must 
consider to see whether our results in Section 3 can be generalized for the n-case. The proposition 1 below 
synthesizes the key generalizations for the fully general n-case: 
 
Proposition 1 
The general replicator system (24) with pricing routine (5) has a unique equilibrium point 
25 
 
𝑠𝑠∗ ∈ 𝐷𝐷 = 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡(∆𝑛𝑛). This point 𝑠𝑠∗ is globally asymptotically stable within D. Therefore, by proving this 





1) First, inspired by the analysis in Section 3, we find that there is always at least an interior resting 
point 𝑠𝑠∗ ∈ 𝐷𝐷 = 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡(∆𝑛𝑛) for (24), which, in clear concordance with the previous sections, is given 
by: 













It is straightforward to see that, if we substitute this expression in (24), we obtain that in 𝑠𝑠∗, 𝑠𝑠?̇?𝚤 = 0,∀𝑖𝑖 is 
always verified. 
 
2) Second, to guarantee that our results in Section 3 are robust and valid for any n, we have to check 
also the stability of 𝑠𝑠∗. In fact, since we are going to verify that 𝑠𝑠∗is globally asymptotically stable 
within D, we also see that 𝑠𝑠∗ is the unique equilibrium within D. We proceed by using the direct 
Lyapunov method of proof (Weibull 1995). Thus, we have defined D= 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡(∆𝑛𝑛) which is an open 
invariant set, in fact it is an invariant neighborhood of the interior equilibrium point 𝑠𝑠∗. By using 
the Lyapunov method, we can assure that 𝑠𝑠∗ is unique and globally asymptotically stable within 
D if we find a continuous and differentiable function 𝑉𝑉:𝐷𝐷 → 𝑅𝑅  that verifies the following 
properties in D: 
i) 𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠) = 0 ⇔ 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑠𝑠∗ , and 𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠) > 0   ∀𝑠𝑠 ≠ 𝑠𝑠∗ in D. 
ii) ∀𝑠𝑠 ≠ 𝑠𝑠∗ in D, and we also see that  𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑠𝑠)
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
< 0.  




�  = −∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 �
1+𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)
∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)(1+𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡))𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1
�  is a strict Lyapunov function in D, verifying 
conditions i) and ii). Let us verify this: 
 
*Regarding i), notice that in 𝑠𝑠∗ all prices are equal and identical to the average price ?̅?𝑝(𝑡𝑡).  As a 
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consequence, 𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠∗) = −∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 (1)=0.  
On the other hand, for any 𝑠𝑠 ≠ 𝑠𝑠∗ within D, 𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠) = −∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 �
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)
?̅?𝑝(𝑡𝑡)
� > 0 ⇔ ∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 �
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)
?̅?𝑝(𝑡𝑡)
� < 0 ⇔
𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 �∏ �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)
?̅?𝑝(𝑡𝑡)













This expression is equivalent to proving that �𝑝𝑝1(𝑡𝑡).𝑝𝑝2(𝑡𝑡) … .𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡)� < ?̅?𝑝(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛. Then, this expression is 
true if ?̅?𝑝(𝑡𝑡) > �𝑝𝑝1(𝑡𝑡).𝑝𝑝2(𝑡𝑡) … .𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡)
𝑛𝑛 . We remember that ?̅?𝑝(𝑡𝑡)is the weighted average of the prices in 
the sector, while �𝑝𝑝1(𝑡𝑡).𝑝𝑝2(𝑡𝑡) … .𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡)
𝑛𝑛  is the geometric mean of those prices. With all prices being 
positive, and considering a non-excessive degree of price dispersion (since we are modeling a sector in 
which close varieties of the same good are produced and supplied), then we can affirm that ?̅?𝑝(𝑡𝑡) is a 
sufficiently good approximation of the arithmetic mean of the prices. It is well known that, in these 
conditions, the arithmetic mean is always significantly higher than the geometric mean, and therefore, in 
our conditions, ?̅?𝑝(𝑡𝑡) > �𝑝𝑝1(𝑡𝑡).𝑝𝑝2(𝑡𝑡) … .𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡)
𝑛𝑛 and condition i) (for 𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠)  to be a strict Lyapunov 
function) is verified. We can affirm that 𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠) = 0 ⇔ 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑠𝑠∗ and 𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠) > 0   ∀𝑠𝑠 ≠ 𝑠𝑠∗ in D. 
 







< 0.  
Notice that the average price with this routine is ?̅?𝑝 = 1 + ∑𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖2 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖. 
Considering (5) and (24) we take derivatives in ?̅?𝑝 :  
𝑑𝑑?̅?𝑝
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
= −2𝛽𝛽� 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝑝) =
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
− 2𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣(𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠, 𝑝𝑝) < 0 
It is clear that this is true because, since  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 , the covariance between the prices (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖) and 
the margins (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) is always positive. Therefore,  
𝑑𝑑?̅?𝑝
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
< 0   

















<0) that −𝑛𝑛 (𝑑𝑑?̅?𝑝/𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡)
?̅?𝑝
> 0, but we have to study the remaining summand, that is, what can we state 
















� (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝑝) = −𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣 �
𝛼𝛼
𝑝𝑝
,𝑝𝑝� > 0 
We can see that the expression is positive since we have a negative covariance between the prices (𝑝𝑝) and 




𝑖𝑖=1 > 0  and 
−𝑛𝑛 (𝑑𝑑?̅?𝑝/𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡)
?̅?𝑝




Therefore, we have verified that a strict Lyapunov function exists with the expression: 
𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠) = −∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 �
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)
?̅?𝑝(𝑡𝑡)
�  = −∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 �
1+𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)
∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)�1+𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)�𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1
� for (24) with the routine (5), which assures 
that the point 𝑠𝑠∗is a unique and globally asymptotically stable resting point within D= 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡(∆𝑛𝑛).  
                                     ∎ 
 
Proposition 1 generalizes the results in Section 3 for the “n” case. We present now an illustrative 
simulation of system (24) and routine (5) to help the reader in understanding that all the results in Section 
3 are generalized through proposition 1. Without any loss of generality, we consider the case of n=5 (as 
an illustration of high n), with parametric values 𝛼𝛼1 =0.52, 𝛼𝛼2 =0.5, 𝛼𝛼3 =0.6, 𝛼𝛼4 =0.5, 𝛼𝛼5 =0.47, 𝛽𝛽 =
0.2, and initial conditions 𝑠𝑠10 =0.2, 𝑠𝑠20 =0.04, 𝑠𝑠30 =0.45, 𝑠𝑠40 =0.06, 𝑠𝑠50 =0.25.  













) is shown in 
Figure 3. Qualitatively identical results can be obtained with the routine (4), exactly as we saw for two 
and three firms in Section 3. The simulations that we present hereby are simply an illustration, as 






Figure 3. Illustrative simulation of (24) with five firms, convergence to 𝑠𝑠∗ 
 
In Figures 4, 5, and 6, we show the corresponding trajectories of prices, the average price, and firm profits 












































































Time: 1 to 100 tending towards 1.1 






Figure 6. The trajectories of firm profits during the convergence to 𝑠𝑠∗ 
 
In economic terms, if we wanted to interpret the Proposition 1, we can say that it conveys and generalizes 
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generating, discovering, and taking advantage of price differentials. Thus, setting out from any 
economically relevant initial condition for our general n-version (24) (that is to say, starting out from any 
𝑠𝑠 ≠ 𝑠𝑠∗ in D no matter where we use routine (4) or (5)) there is always a potential of welfare improvement 
through market trading both for consumers and firms. This information is being generated, updated, 
indicated by prices, imperfectly perceived by consumers, and regenerated step by step as time goes by. 
The market gradually generates, indicates, and takes advantage of this potential as time passes. The 
dynamics of supply-demand interactions in our model revealed that this potential tends to be gradually 
exhausted. The market evolves and tends towards 𝑠𝑠∗ (see Figures 3 to 6). 
This process resembles the typical Austrian representation of market competition as a discovery process.  
Moreover, regarding the literature on evolutionary games, and bringing out the comparative analysis 
performed in Section 4, it is interesting to highlight that the point 𝑠𝑠∗ is a Nash-equilibrium stable state in 
our evolutionary model. Thus, neither consumers nor firms gain anything if either individually or in small 
masses they decide to move unilaterally away from 𝑠𝑠∗. Firms would either erode their extra-profits (see 
Figure 6) going into a price war if they decided to lower prices, or unilaterally lose customers if they 
increased prices. In the case of consumers, if a mass of them decided to abandon 𝑠𝑠∗ they would generate 
a price increase in the landing firm (which erodes their welfare as compared with Figure 4), and they 
would generate a reduction in the price of the original firm. This situation would be reversed quickly, 
thereby restoring point 𝑠𝑠∗. Notice, however, that the limit point 𝑠𝑠∗ in our evolutionary model represents 
a very different type of situation when compared with the Nash-stable state in the Bertrand neoclassical 
game. As we have seen when comparing Sections 3 and 4, and now in Figures 3 to 6, our evolutionary 
market makes extra-profits even at the limit; firms tend to co-exist by sharing the market but they do not 
necessarily have identical shares; and the process tends to 𝑠𝑠∗  by decreasing the average price and 
equalizing firm prices, thus generating an ongoing gain of consumer welfare (with no danger of collusion). 
This is very different from the zero extra-profits and identical sharing of the Bertrand game, or from the 
collusion potential result in the repeated Bertrand game. 
Of course this first extension of the model opens a whole research line (by incorporating innovation, 
performance, and institutions in this simple model) along the lines of what we have explored in Almudi 
et al. (2012, 2013) or Fatas-Villafranca et al. (2009). Still, we believe that the step-by-step analytical 
process through which we have reflected on the nature of markets as information processors, and the 
comparisons with the neoclassical Bertrand game are essential. In fact, we can note that the Bertrand result 
in Section 4 (no extra-profits, identical sharing of the market) might be obtained (as a very special concrete 
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case of our evolutionary model) if we ruled out the dynamics and focused just on the static point 𝑠𝑠∗ for 
the very special case in which 𝑛𝑛 → ∞. As a future research line, we can compare classic results in repeated 
games with threats (applying Folk theorems) with the solutions from our evolutionary model. But the 
explorations of these possibilities exceed the scope of this single paper. Therefore, we leave aside these 
reflections for future works, and we will finish this paper by considering the evolutionary case with cost 
heterogeneity and process innovation affecting the dynamics of unit costs. 
 
5.2 Heterogeneous costs and technological advance 
In this extension, we will work with the pricing routine (2) with unit costs different from “1” (although 
everything can be extended to the case of routine (1) since both are dynamically equivalent). We can re-
write the original system as follows: 
𝑠𝑠?̇?𝚤 = 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)�∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)�                          (25) 
  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) =
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 − 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)
  , 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 > 1   (𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . ,𝑛𝑛). 
The extension we now present considers that, instead of using a common and constant firm unit-cost c, 
we incorporate in the pricing routine (2) a changing firm specific unit cost  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡).  
Then we have the system: 
𝑠𝑠?̇?𝚤 = 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)�∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)�                          (26) 
  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) =
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 − 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)
  , 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 > 1   (𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . ,𝑛𝑛). 
We need to specify a plausible expression for  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡). Thus, we can assume a firm specific production 
function (with full use of labor as the main input and elastic labor supply) such as 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡), in 
which 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) represents labor productivity. Likewise, we can assume that there is raw material used in 
production the price and technical coefficient of which are common and constant among firms. We can 
assume that the unit raw material cost is denoted by 𝜓𝜓 > 0, and represents the cost per unit of output of 
specialized minerals or energy, or other materials bought at a constant and common price in large 
international markets. This is a characteristic that is plausible for such high tech sectors as 
microelectronics, pharmaceutical biotechnology, genomics. We may state the total cost of each firm as 
given by: 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) + 𝜓𝜓𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) 
If we use the wage as numerairy w=1 (see Section 2) and, without loss of generality, we consider the unit 
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+ 1 = 1 + 1
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)
,    𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) is labor productivity. 
In this manner, we can introduce cost heterogeneity in (26). In fact, we go a step further and we can also 
include certain dynamics of technological advance. We propose a function for the time-path of each firm’s 
labor productivity as follows: 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑡𝑡−𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖            (27) 
Abundant literature supporting this type of exponential productivity growth pattern can be found, from 
different perspectives and commented on by several different authors, in the overview by Nelson (2018).  
In (27), 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) is the firm’s market share, 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 > 1 is a firm specific parameter capturing organizational 
rigidity when assimilating technological advances (its value may be related with the organizational 
difficulties in learning and updating processes), and 𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0,∞[ is the variable time. The market share 
incorporates a success-breeds-success (dynamic) increasing returns component in the unit cost. If we 
introduce equation (27) in the expression for firm unit cost we obtain: 




                                             (28) 
This unit cost function with learning and technological advance has important empirically-relevant 
properties. Thus, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(0) = 1 +
1
1+𝑒𝑒−𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖
> 1, and we also see in (28) that the 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 1
𝑡𝑡→∞
 is a function 
that is monotonically decreasing with time (with an asymptotic lower bound in “1” for comparability with 
previous sections), and it shows an inverse S-shaped profile (first strictly concave, then strictly convex) 
with a time-inflection point at 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
. The endogenous (and evolving) component 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) appears as a 
success-breeds-success mechanism pointing to the fact that those firms that gain share and profitability in 
our model achieve more resources to try to accelerate learning and technological advance. We can also 
identify equation (28) with a type of learning curve with labor enhancing technological advance, a success-
breeds-success mechanism, and a firm specific rigidity component 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖. The inverse S-shaped (decreasing) 
pattern resembles those paths recently found in genomics and bio-pharm industries, and it can also be 
related to the well-known cost-reduction paths observed in semiconductors, computers or the automobile 
industries (see Dosi et al. 1988, or, more recently, Nelson 2018).  




𝑠𝑠?̇?𝚤 = 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)�∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)�           (29) 
 
   𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) =
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 − 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)  , 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 > 1  , (𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛𝑛), 





It is worth noting that, if we substitute 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) in the pricing routine, and we operate, we arrive at a new 
expression for the price  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) that must be introduced into the replicator equation. Thus, we have: 









This expression must be incorporated within the replicator system. Nevertheless, notice that ?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) =
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖−𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)
 is exactly the routine in equation (4), which we used in the analysis for Section 3. Then, we can 
re-write the price as: 




It is very important to realize here that, if we look at a sector with a moderate degree of firm heterogeneity 
so that the replicator dynamics operate slowly, then as 𝑡𝑡 → ∞, the second summand 𝑝𝑝�𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)
1+𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑡𝑡−𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖
 will have 
time to almost vanish through technical advance, and the price that will tend to work within the replicator 
(29) will be exactly the one in Section 3 (equation (4)). In this case, the limit behavior of our extended 
model with technological change and heterogeneous unit costs is exactly the one we have already analyzed 
in Sections 3 and 5.1. Of course, the transient dynamics are a little different, but the results will essentially 
confirm the findings in Sections 3 and 5.1.  
As an example of these circumstances in system (29), we show the results of a simulation converging to 
the globally asymptotically stable interior resting point in Figures 7, 8, and 9. Prices end up converging to 
a common value, all firms share the market, and they gain positive extra-profits. An example to illustrate 
this situation that confirms the results in the previous sections would be a setting (for the case of n=5 
firms) with parametric values 𝛽𝛽 = 0.1, 𝜂𝜂1 = 1.1, 𝜂𝜂2 = 1.10011, 𝜂𝜂3 = 1.105,  𝜂𝜂4 = 1.1,  𝜂𝜂5 = 1.025, 𝑏𝑏i = 11  (𝑖𝑖 =
1, … ,5),    𝑠𝑠10 = 0.205,   𝑠𝑠20 = 0.2,   𝑠𝑠30 = 0.19,   𝑠𝑠40 = 0.21,   𝑠𝑠50 = 0.195. We obtain the market evolution that we 














































































Figure 9. Simulation of (29) with five firms, profits 
 
Apart from other simulation experiments that we could run in the future, in Figures 7, 8, and 9, we 
essentially obtain a confirmation and generalization of the results obtained in the previous sections. In this 
simulation, the dynamics have a unique interior asymptotically stable state, in which firms share the 
market, the level of market concentration tends to be not very high, firms get extra-profits, and prices 
equalize with a declining average price in the sector so that consumers gain payoff. These are qualitatively 
identical results to those obtained in Sections 3 and 5.1 departing from the model in Section 2, and they 
can also be obtained for the other pricing routine.  
Nevertheless, in this evolutionary neo-Schumpeterian extension, new possibilities appear. As we increase 
the degree of heterogeneity and the inter-firm distinct capabilities for technological advance, the transient 
effects of uneven firm-evolution become very significant, and system (29) does not have time for technical 
change to erode sufficiently unit costs. In these conditions, we find an enormous variety of dynamic paths 
(in such a simple model), in which what happens out of equilibrium endogenously separates the system 
from the interior resting point. In these conditions, even in such a simple evolutionary model, we have 
market trajectories leading the system either to resting points on the faces of the simplex, or to any of the 
edges, or even to one of the vertices of the simplex. Despite its simplicity, our evolutionary model is robust 
to important changes in the specification and also under certain Schumpeterian conditions. However, once 
we span the array of possibilities in the Schumpeterian specification (and again in spite of the model’s 
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whole line of theoretical advance. In fact, in future works, the ranges delimiting the corresponding 
outcomes could be analyzed in a closed-form manner. For illustrative purposes, and to close this paper, 
we now show a case in which we run the Schumpeterian model and the market selects a duopoly. We set 
out from system (29) with n=5 firms, and values 𝛽𝛽 = 0.1, 𝜂𝜂1 = 1.1, 𝜂𝜂2 = 1.4,𝜂𝜂3 = 1.2,  𝜂𝜂4 = 1.3,  𝜂𝜂5 = 1.1, si0 =




Figure 10. Simulation of (29) with five firms, market shares, non-convergence to interior 
 
 

































































Figure 12. Simulation of (29) with five firms, profits, non-convergence to interior 
 
Two price segments emerge in Figure 11 (which correspond to two different types of firm capabilities for 
technological advance, for the reduction of unit costs and for profits—see Figure 12), and the market ends 
up selecting (as we see in Figure 10) the most innovative firms 1 and 3. Still, notice that the surviving 
firms 1 and 3 are heterogeneous, both in their capacity to innovate and also in their respective mark-up 
parameters. We leave aside for future works the wide variety of experiments that can be carried out from 
this simple (but tractable and amenable to extensions and easy applications) evolutionary model, and we 
will now finish the paper by synthesizing our conclusions. 
 
 
6 Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have devised and analyzed a tractable evolutionary model and, then, we have compared 
the closed-form results with the corresponding properties of a well-known neoclassical exemplar. We 
have also proposed an extension of the basic evolutionary setting in which we have considered cost 
heterogeneous firms and technological advance. We have seen that there is a great difference in the results, 
depending on whether we apply a fully-rational plus perfect-knowledge game, or an evolutionary dynamic 
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As we have shown, when we assume bounded-rationality in the evolutionary model from both the point 
of view of firms (which do not maximize profits but are profit-seekers, and adjust their prices depending 
on demand change), and also from the point of view of consumers (who gradually learn better price options 
but still show myopia and inertial patterns), we obtain dynamics converging to a stable interior equilibrium 
where firms end up obtaining extra-profits and compete with moderate prices, and consumers do not see 
their welfare eroded by excessively high prices. These conclusions are essentially maintained in the 
extended version of the model. By contrast, within the neoclassical Bertrand game (with full rationality 
and perfect knowledge), at least in simple situations, firms do not obtain extra-profits (as they are 
incapable of maintaining a collusive agreement) and they end up competing over prices until they reach 
the null extra-profits Nash-state. Even in the case in which firms might collude in the repeated Bertrand 
setting, the resulting prices in collusion turn out to be higher than those emerging from the evolutionary 
model. 
These different outcomes on market functioning lead us to pose the following reflection: the bounds on 
information in demand and supply, the dynamics of evolving market power, as well as the persistence of 
heterogeneity and the need to learn and adapt in evolutionary frameworks may bring about welfare 
patterns that may be more balanced than those arising in the Bertrand setting (with full-rationality and 
perfect-knowledge of the game). In the evolutionary case, prices and profits continuously adapt and 
change, the market tends to produce moderate prices and consumers do not have to bear such a high 
welfare cost as in the colluded situation of the Bertrand model. This comparative result is surprising, to 
say the least.  
What we have found seems to indicate that the fact that the world is only partially understandable, that 
there are learning and adjustment costs, agents are different, and neither consumers nor firms act 
permanently as perfect-maximizers with complete knowledge, may not actually represent a series of 
market failures. On the contrary, these apparent imperfections may be at the very basis of what makes the 
market work. If this were the case, we should consider these aspects as key features of reality in order to 
improve our understanding of market processes. We believe that this is the line along which neo-
Schumpeterian evolutionary economics seeks to advance. The way ahead surely includes extending the 
analysis to confront price formation in multi-sector innovative co-evolutionary settings with price 
explanations in general equilibrium models. Likewise, comparative exercises consisting of testing 
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